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WARRANTY LAW IN MARYLAND PRODUCT LIABILITY
CASES: STRICT LIABILITY INCOGNITO?
Martin H. Freeman and Delverne A. Dresseltt
The authors consider the question of whether warranty law in
Maryland now provides the plaintiff in a product liability case
with a cause of action similar to that which would be available
under the doctrine of strict liability in tort. The development of
the strict liability doctrine is traced and its current scope and
requirements for recovery are compared with those of the
action for breach of the implied warranty provided in the
Uniform Commercial Code.
One of the most phenomenal events in product liability law has been
the rapid adoption by most jurisdictions of "strict liability in tort."'
The courts in these jurisdictions have supplemented common law
negligence remedies by creating a new theory of tort liability. This
doctrine allows recovery by any person who was injured by a defective
product, regardless of whether he was a party to the contract for its
sale. 2
Maryland is not among the jurisdictions that have adopted strict
liability in tort. 3 Yet the question arises of whether gradual changes in

Maryland law have accomplished a similar result. This article will
examine that question. A discussion of the origin and development of
the doctrine of strict liability will be followed by a comparison of its
current scope with the scope of the action for breach of an implied4
warranty of merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter referred to as the Code] as it now exists in Maryland.'
tB.S., M.E., and B.A., 1961, Lehigh University; J.D., 1965, George Washington
University; Associate, Bulman, Goldstein, Feld and Dunie, Bethesda, Maryland; Member of the
Prince George's County and Maryland State Bar Associations.
ttB.A., 1952, Heidelberg College; LL.B., 1956, University of Maryland; Assistant City
Solicitor, 1966-1967; Fellow, International Academy of Trial Lawyers; Member of the
Baltimore City and Maryland State Bar Associations.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Jana H. Guy, Symposium and
Articles Editor, and Shelly Mintz, University of Baltimore Law Review staff.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965) outlines the parameters of the doctrine.
See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 960, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
2. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.791
(196(%) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, 50 MINN. L. REV. ], explains the doctrine and gives an
account of its development.
3. Maryland has refused to espouse the doctrine in Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274
Md. 288, 299, 336 A.2d 118, 124 (1975); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272
Md. 201, 221, 321 A.2d 737, 747-48 (1974); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md.
282, 296, 252 A.2d 855, 864 (1969).

4.

MD. ANN. CODE,

Comm. L. Art., § 2-314 (1975).

5. The primary focus of this article is on the potential for recovery for damages caused by a
defect in the construction or assembly of a product as opposed to a defect in its design. In

48
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Under the doctrine of "strict liability in tort," a seller is liable to
users or consumers of his product for injuries to their person or
property that are caused by an unreasonably dangerous defect in the
product, and there is no need for the plaintiff to prove negligence or
privity of contract, or to conform with any of the other
formal
6
requirements traditionally associated with contract actions.
In order to understand how these technical legal impediments to
recovery were eliminated it is necessary to understand how they came
into being. The warranty obligation originally provided the basis for a
deceit action in tort.7 Eventually it evolved to the status of contract
with the inevitable result that a breach of warranty action came to be
regarded as inseparable from a contract action, and the privity
requirement, an elementary premise of contract law, attached.8
The privity requirement was simply that one must be a party to a
contract in order to have standing to enforce it or to claim damages for
a breach of its warranties. 9 Under this limitation, only the buyer could
maintain a cause of action for a breach of warranty, and the buyer's
action was only against his immediate seller. He could not sue others
further up the chain of title, such as the manufacturer or distributor.
Exceptions to this requirement began to develop. The courts first
allowed recovery in the absence of privity when an "inherently
dangerous" product was involved and the defendant's negligence could
be proved.1 0 Then came what Prosser considered the first major breach
in the privity barrier: the 1916 decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. 11 Cardozo there stated a rule that literally swallowed the
exception: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing
of danger. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that
the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser... then,
Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974), the Maryland
Court of Appeals rejected the suggestion that strict liability would provide a more viable
theory of recovery than negligence for damages flowing from a design defect, due to the
fact that the "reasonableness" of the design is the crucial test for recovery under both
theories. Id. at 221, 321 A.2d at 747-48. While the strict liability theory of recovery may
have other advantages over negligence in design defect cases, it would seem that the
greatest area of confusion is in the conflicts and differences between the results achievable
under warranty law and those achievable under strict liability law with respect to
construction defect cases. Thus the scope of this article is confined to this latter topic.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment m at 355 (1965). See Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 960, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700

(1963).
7. For a history of the warranty action, see Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 326
F. Supp. 709, 714-15 (D. Md. 1971).
8. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J.
1099, 1126-27 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, 69 YALEL. J.].
9. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
10. Langridge v. Levy, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397
(1852).
11. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing is under a duty
to make it carefully."' 12 This expanded duty was rapidly adopted
throughout the country, and extended to the point that "[N]o one
now seriously disputes the broad general rule that the seller of a chattel
is always liable for his negligence,"' 3 regardless of his lack of privity
with the plaintiff.
Almost simultaneously, the privity barrier suffered a double-barrelled
attack from another direction. Courts in a few states began to allow
recovery against manufacturers of defective foodstuffs when neither
privity of contract nor negligence was present.' 4 Eventually a theory
was developed, on grounds of public policy, that an "implied warranty"
ran with these goods from the manufacturer to the consumer.' 5 This
rationale was based on the idea that warranty, being the child of both
tort and contract, had retained some of its tort inheritance and could
thus provide a basis for recovery in the absence of proof of
negligence. 16
Some attempts were made to expand the exception for food
products to mechanical products, 1 7 but, according to Prosser' 8 the
"dramatic moment" of the fall of the citadel of privity came with the
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. 19 In that case, the driver of an automobile, who was the
wife of the purchaser, sustained injuries when a defect in the
automobile's steering mechanism caused it to collide with a wall. At
that time, a warranty of merchantability was implied in every sales
contract under the Uniform Sales Act. Although the defendant
automobile manufacturer had attempted to evade this implied warranty
by removing itself from privity with the retail purchaser and by giving a
limited express warranty in conjunction with a disclaimer of the
implied warranty,20 the Henningsen court held that an implied
warranty of suitability for use nevertheless accompanied new automobiles from the manufacturer into the hands of the ultimate
purchaser. 2 '
Other states quickly began to adopt this approach, which was
actually "strict liability upon a warranty,, 22 and to apply it to a
12. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
13. Prosser, 69 YALE L. J. at 1103. But see Moore v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 282 A.2d 625
(Del. 1970); Kates v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 263 A.2d 308 (Del. 1970).
14. See Parks v. G.C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 P. 202 (1914); Mazetti v. Armour &
Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
15. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
16. See Prosser, 69 YALEL. J. at 1126-27.
17. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Continental
Copper & Steel Indus. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958).
18. Prosser, 50 MINN. L. REV. at 791.
19. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
20. Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
21. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
22. Prosser, 50 MINN. L. REV. at 800.
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variety of products.
It soon became evident, however, that the use of
the warranty concept as a vehicle for imposing liability without fault
was not devoid of problems. Even when the privity requirement was
eliminated, the claimant's case was restricted by the seller's disclaimers
of warranty; limitations on the scope of the implied warranties of
fitness for purpose or merchantability; the possibility of recision of the
sale, the notice of breach requirements; the necessity of reliance upon
any representations; and potential for preclusion of wrongful death
damages in warranty cases. 24

Instead of attempting to deal with the problems apparently inherent
in this implied warranty concept of recovery, legal scholars advanced
another solution: give the concept another name. If the desired result
was a theory that would "combine the contractual notions of liability
without fault with the tort notions that the injured party need not be a
party to the sales contract," 25 why not call the theory strict liability in
tort and eliminate the warranty connotations and requirements? 26 The
American Law Institute adopted this suggestion in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which stated the strict liability theory as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if,
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applied although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 27

23. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Simpson v. Power Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555
(C.P. 1963); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965);
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963); Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div.
2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D.
1965).
24. Prosser, 69 YALE L. J.at 1127-34. These limitations are discussed in more detail infra,
beginning at p. 23.
25. R. NORDSTROM, SALES, § 90 at 279 (1970).
26. See Prosser, 69 YALE L. J. at 1134.
27. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)OF TORTS, § 402A (1965).
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As the law now stands, Maryland is one of only five states that have
not accepted the concept of strict liability in tort.28 Yet Prosser
suggested that, given enough time, the problems with warranty might
have been solved by changes in the sales law or amendments to the
Uniform Commercial Code 29 and stated that the transition from
warranty to strict liability in tort is "more one of theory than
substance."3
There is no magic in the name given to a cause of action,
and breach of warranty can be as useful an action as strict liability in
tort provided it is not burdened with the difficulties that have
traditionally accompanied warranty law. If Maryland warranty law has
eliminated these burdens, then strict liability has arrived in Maryland,
via warranty instead of tort.
WARRANTY
The Uniform Commercial Code, which applies to sales transactions,
supplies the current basis for a warranty action in Maryland. Subsection
one of Section 2-314 provides the following implied warranty:
Unless excluded or modified..., a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
Under this section, the serving for value of food or drink to be
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale .. ."
Subsection two defines merchantable goods as, inter alia, those goods
that "are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and ... adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require ..
Although the Code also provides for an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose3 3 and for express warranties,34 the implied
warranty of merchantability requires fewer elements of proof and is
thus the most viable route to a result equivalent to that allowed under
strict liability in tort.3" A comparison of the requirements for recovery
28. 1 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP.
4060, at 4036-37 (1974). Alabama, Delaware, Georgia,
Massachusetts are the others. Puerto Rico has not adopted the doctrine, however the
District of Columbia has. Id.
29. Prosser, 50 MINN. L. REV. at 801.
30. Id. at 804. See Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879
(1967).
31. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314(1) (1975).
32. Id. § 2-314(2).
33. Id. § 2-315.
34. Id. § 2-313.
35. To recover for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the plaintiff need not
prove that the seller made any representation about the goods, as he would for express
warranty (Compare § 2-314 with § 2-313), nor need he prove that the seller knew that
he intended to use the product for a particular purpose and that he was relying on the
seller's skill or judgement to furnish suitable goods, which is required to recover under
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under an implied warranty of merchantability with the requirements of
recovery under the strict liability in tort doctrine, as it is currently
applied, will reveal the inadequacies, if any, of the warranty remedy.
The Privity Requirement
As discussed earlier,3 6 under the warranty law requirement of privity
of contract a seller is liable to no person other than his immediate
buyer.3" In product defect cases, it is necessary to subdivide privity of
contract into two broad classifications in order to fully comprehend its
import. Vertical privity encompasses the rights of the purchaser against
persons in the chain of title other than his immediate seller, such as the
manufacturer or distributor.3" Horizontal privity applies to the rights
of a user of the goods who is not the original purchaser.3 9
The Vertical Chain
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a warranty of merchantability
is effective only against a "seller." 40
That term is defined in
Section 2-103(1)(d) as "a person who sells or contracts to sell goods."
Thus, until recent amendments an injured purchaser could recover
damages from his immediate seller only. Effective July 1, 1969,
Section 2-314 was amended to provide that for Sections 2-314 through
2-318 the definition of "seller" includes "the manufacturer, distributor,
dealer, wholesaler or other middleman or the retailer....,4
The
amendment also expressly abolished the requirement of privity as
between the buyer and these parties in an action brought by the
buyer.4 2
the implied

warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (Compare § 2-314 with

§ 2-315).
It should be noted here that, under Section 2-313, an express warranty provides for
recovery somewhat analagous to that provided under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 402(b) (1965), entitled "Misrepresentation by Seller of Chattels to Consumer."
However, while privity of contract with the defendant is required to recover under
Section 2-313, unless the action is brought .by the buyer (Compare § 2-314(1)(a) with
§ 2-314(1)(b)), it is not a prerequisite to recovery under Section 402B of the
Restatement. Further comparison of Section 2-313 of the Code with Section 402B of
the Restatement is beyond the scope of this article.
36. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
37. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
38. Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in ProductsLiability Cases, 48
VA. L. REV. 982, 985 (1962); Note, Third Party Beneficiaries of Warrantiesin Maryland,

2 U. BALT. L. REv. 294, 295 (1973).
39. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 998-1000 (1966).
40. MD. ANN. CoDE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314 (1975).

41. Law of April 23, 1969, ch. 249, [1969] Laws of Md. 709, codified in MD. ANN. CODE,
Comm. L. Art., § 2-314(1)(a) (1975).
42. Law of April 23, 1969, ch. 249, [1969] Laws of Md. 709, codified in MD. ANN. CODE,
Comm. L. Art., § 2-314(1)(b) (1975). This second amendment apparently accomplishes

the additional result that, with respect to an action for breach of express warranty under
Section 2-313, the buyer may sue others in the chain of title than his direct seller.
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43

the Maryland Court of
In Frericks v. General Motors Corp.
Appeals specifically confirmed that a plaintiff who otherwise qualifies
to bring a breach of implied warranty action may bring it against the
manufacturer as well as the retail vendor. The court ruled that "[I n
light of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code definition of 'seller'
the allegations are sufficient to state a breach of warranty cause of
action against both General Motors [manufacturer] and Anchor
Thus, the vertical privity requirement no longer provides
[retailer] .
an obstacle to recovery in warranty in Maryland.
The Horizontal Chain
When the Maryland legislature amended Section 2-314, changing the
definition of seller to abolish the requirement of privity along the
vertical chain, Section 2-318 of the Code was also amended, resulting in
the abolishment of the horizontal privity requirement in sales of
consumer goods for users, consumers, or persons affected by the goods
if it would be reasonable to expect these persons to use, consume, or be
affected by the goods.45
The outer limits of the Section 2-318 amendment have not been
defined. However, in Frericks v. General Motors Corp.,46 the court
held that a guest in an automobile was qualified to recover under
Section 2-318. Although no Maryland appellate court has discussed the
issue of bystander recovery in warranty,4 7 it is reasonable to expect
that full effect will be given to the amendment, and thus, that "other
persons affected" by the goods, including bystanders, will be allowed to
recover.
This result would correlate with that allowed under the most liberal
interpretation of the strict liability in tort doctrine. Although the
Restatement reserved opinion on whether bystanders should be allowed
recovery, extending the cause of action only to "consumers and users"
49
48
some cases have allowed recovery by bystanders.
of the product,

43. 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975) (manufacturer and retailer held liable for damages
resulting from a secondary collision).

44. Id. at 303, 336 A.2d at 127.
45. Law of April 23, 1969, ch. 249, [1969] Laws of Md. 709, codified in MD.

ANN. CODE,

Comm. L. Art., § 2-318 (1975).
Prior to the amendment of Section 2-318, the privity requirement was eliminated
only with respect to the buyer's family, household and guests.
46. 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
47. But see Proxmire v. General Motors Corp., Civil Action No. 72-1044-N (D. Md., filed
Jan. 19, 1973), where the court, in a memorandum opinion certifying the issue to the
Maryland Court of Appeals, indicated its belief that recovery could be allowed in
Maryland. The case was later settled.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment o (1965). The institute did
acknowledge the increasing demand for consumer protection at all levels.
49. See Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Wasik v. Borg,
423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d
84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694
(Super. Ct. 1965) (plaintiff alleged warranty theory but court overruled a demurrer and
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Despite this extention of the classes of plaintiffs protected by the
implied warranty, a vestige of the horizontal privity requirement may
remain in Maryland. Only those users, consumers or persons affected by
the goods who are "injured in person" are allowed recovery by
Section 2-318.So Other jurisdictions have construed this language to
require that a third party beneficiary to the sale must suffer personal
injury in order to qualify for recovery for a breach of warranty."1
Dictum in Addressograph-Multilith v. Zink, 2 a Maryland Court of
Appeals case, indicates that the Maryland courts will reach a similar
conclusion. Although the Addressograph court held that the facts of
the case required that the manufacturer be equitably estopped from
asserting a lack of privity as a defense, 3 it stated that privity of
contract would otherwise remain an "essential ingredient... in a

50.
51.
52.

53.

allowed the case to go to trial on a theory of strict liability); Lomendola v. Mizell, 115
N.J. Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.
1969). Contra, Torpez v. Red Owl Stores Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955) (sister of
purchaser was injured; court found no implied warranty of fitness when product was
selected by self-service); Rodriguez v. Shell's City Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1962) (§ 402A not mentioned-court required injured user of product).
MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-318 (1975).
Kenney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 Mass. 604, 246 N.E.2d 649 (1969); Leach v. Wiles,
58 Tenn. App. 286, 429 S.W.2d 823 (1968).
273 Md. 255, 329 A.2d 28 (1974). Zink had leased typesetting equipment that was
accompanied by an express warranty from the manufacturer, Addressograph. The
equipment failed to function properly and Zink stopped making the required monthly
payments to the lessor. When the lessor sued for the unpaid balance, Zink countered
with a third-party complaint against Addressograph, alleging that, because of its breach
of the express warranty, any judgment in favor of the lessor should be against
Addressograph. No personal injury or physical damage to property was suffered by Zink.
His only damages were in the nature of loss on his bargain.
One may question why the Code was applied to this case, which involved a lease
rather than a sale (See discussion of leases and bailments infra at p. 65, and MD. ANN.
CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-106(1) (1975)). Where, as here, it is the warranty of the
manufacturer who sold the equipment to the lessor that is being relied upon, rather than
a lessor's warranty, the court will apparently regard the transaction as one falling within
the parameters of the Code.
Addressograph raises another question. Since the warranty being relied upon was
an express warranty, to which Section 2-313 applies, Zink could not take advantage of
the expanded definition of "seller" in Section 2-314(1)(a), which applies only to
Sections 2-314 through 2-318. Thus, the court looked to Section 2-318, which it found
also inapplicable. One wonders, however, why Zink did not invoke Section 2-314(1)(b),
which states that "Any previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the buyer
and any of the aforementioned parties [manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler or
other middleman and/or the retailer] in any action brought by the buyer." (emphasis
added). The court did not address this question, but one possible explanation is that
Zink was actually not a buyer from the manufacturer, even though the manufacturer was
a seller as to Zink's lessor. There is some room for argument that Section 2-314(1)(b),
like Section 2-314(1)(a), has reference only to Sections 2-314 through 2-318. However,
it is strange that this limitation was not expressly mentioned in one subsection but was in
the other. Furthermore, this construction would make Subsection (1)(b) entirely
superfluous.
Finally, however, it should be noted that all of the Addressograph court's
references to the Code are rendered superfluous by its final conclusion that it was
unnecessary to determine whether recovery could be allowed under the Code, since the
same result could be and was achieved under contract law.
273 Md. at 281-82, 329 A.2d at 31-32.
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breach of express warranty action not involving personal injury. '5 4 It
should be noted, however, that the type of injury involved in
Addressograph was what is commonly characterized as economic
loss-loss on the bargain-as opposed to property damage, which is
generally characterized as physical injury to property.'5 Even under
strict liability in tort, which does permit recovery for physical injury to
the property of users and consumers, 6 only a few courts have allowed
recovery for economic losses; 7 others have refused such damages to
parties in non-privity, 5
following Prosser's suggestion that such
damages are more suitably determined and awarded according to the
rules of the contract theory of recovery.5 9 The dictum in Addressograph could thus be read as referring only to personal injury as
distinguished from economic loss; however, the case seems to indicate
that damages for physical injury to property are available under
warranty theory only to those third party beneficiaries who are
personally injured.
Section 2-318 is only a qualifying Section, however, and should not
be read to preclude an award of damages for physical injury to property
or even economic loss,6" when the third party beneficiary is "injured in
person." Once a plaintiff acquires the status of privity of contract by
virtue of either Section 2 -314's extended definition of seller, or
Section 2-318's extension of the Code warranties to third party
54. Id. at 281, 329 A.2d at 31.
55. See note 52 supra. See also Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1965), which distinguished between property damage and economic loss.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965).
57. See, e.g., Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207, A.2d 305 (1965); Lang v.
General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (ND. 1965); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp.,
372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963) (stove exploded destroying house); State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961) (damage to
vehicle from wiring).
58. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Inglis v.
American Motors Corp., 197 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio App. 1964) aff'd., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132,
209 N.E.2d 583 (1965); accord, Prosser, 69 YALE L. J. at 1143;cf. Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963);
Rapson, Products Liability Under ParallelDoctrines: ContrastsBetween the U.C.C. and
Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 692 (1965).
59. Prosser, 50 MINN. L. REV. at 822-23.
60. Cf. Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa, 1975). The
plaintiff sued the distributor and manufacturer of drop forging hammers that failed to
perform, alleging a breach of implied and express warranties under the Code. In denying
a motion to dismiss, the court relied on strict liability law to avoid the personal injury
restriction of Section 2-318, and held that the plaintiff could recover from the
manufacturer with whom he was not in privity. However, in discussing damages, the
court, noting that the economic losses sought were not recoverable under strict liability
law in Iowa, characterized the case as one resting in contract, citing Hawkeye-Security
Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 381-82 (Iowa 1972), which had
acknowledged that both implied warranty under the Code and strict liability could form
independent theories for recovery. This characterization of the claim under contract law
permitted the plaintiff to invoke the long-arm statute, and presumably, to recover
economic losses on the contract, even though strict liability theory was the basis for the
dismissal of the lack of privity defense.
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beneficiaries, he should be regarded as entitled to all of the remedies
that a buyer could recover from his direct seller, unless the Code
expressly provides otherwise elsewhere.6"
The Notice Requirement
Section 2-607(3)(a) of the Code provides:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered any breach, notify
the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy.... 62
Courts in various jurisdictions have suggested that the purpose of this
notice requirement is to protect a seller against unduly delayed
claims,6 3 to enable him to "minimize any damages or correct the
defect, ' 64 and to require that he be informed that the "transaction is
troublesome and must be watched. ' 65 In the product liability context,
the rule has been interpreted as intended to give the defendant an
opportunity to properly defend his claim by marshalling evidence while
it is still available. 6 6 Dean Prosser, however, takes issue with the
application of the rule in product liability cases involving personal
injury:
[T]he injured consumer is "seldom steeped in the 'business
practice' which justifies the rule," and at least until he has legal
advice it will not occur to him to give notice to one with whom
he has no dealings.6 7
Several jurisdictions have nevertheless applied the notice requirement
to the consumer buyer of a defective product that caused injury. 6 8 The
Maryland appellate courts have not directly faced this situation. In

61. See Sections 2-316 and 2-316.1, discussed infra at p. 61.
62. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., 2-607(3)(a) (1975).

63. See American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 7 F.2d
565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925), cited by Prosser in 50 MINN. L. REv. at 829.
64. Wagner Tractor Inc. v. Shields, 381 F.2d 441, 445 (9th Cir. 1967). See Chemetron Corp.
v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 254 (N.D. Ill. 1974), where it was held that
notice was not required in a suit for non-delivery because it was too late to remedy the
situation and notice would have achieved nothing.
65. Metro Investment Corp. v. Portland Road Lumber Co., 263 Ore. 76, 501 P.2d 312
(1972). See also MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-607, Comment 4 (1975).
66. See Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974); Leeper v. Banks,
487 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1972); San Antonio v. Warwick Club Gingerale Co., 104 R.I. 700,
248 A.2d 778 (1968).
67. Prosser, 50 MINN. L. REV. at 829, citing James, Products Liability, 34 Thx. L. REv. 144,
192-97.
68. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974); Leeper v. Banks, 487
S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1972); San Antonio v. Warwick Club Gingerale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 248

A.2d 778 (1968).
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however, the Court of Special Appeals applied the
Smith v. Butler,
requirement in a breach of warranty case where the buyer sued his
seller for losses incurred due to the inoperability of the product he
purchased.
Although this case did not involve personal injury, there was no
indication that the court would rule differently in that circumstance. 10
The notice requirement can be expected to pose a problem in Maryland
to any buyer whose suit is based on breach of warranty, whereas there
would be no notice problem with a suit based on strict liability in tort.
This is not a severe problem for a consumer buyer, however, since he
knows who his seller was and can probably locate him and give notice
within the required "reasonable time."
This is particularly true in light of the liberal construction taken by
Comment five to Section 2-607 of the "reasonable time" requirement
when a retail customer is involved. That Comment states that, for the
retail buyer, a reasonable time is a reasonable time after "he becomes
aware of the legal situation, '' 71 and apparently contemplates the fact
that the ordinary consumer buyer will not know that he is required to
give notice to his seller until he has consulted an attorney. Furthermore, the notice requirement is a flexible one. There is no need to
inform the seller of the precise nature of the defect; notification that a
breach has occurred is sufficient.7 2 In Smith, the court held that there
is no requirement that the notice be written; a telephone call would be
sufficient to sustain the buyer's rights. 73 The court also stated that

69. 19 Md. App. 467, 311 A.2d 813 (1973).
70. There is room for an argument that Section 2-607(3)(a) should not be imposed on a
retail buyer whose claim is for breach of warranty, as opposed to revocation of
acceptance, since the Section can be construed as addressed only to the requirement that
notification precede revocation of acceptance.
The 2-600 series of the Code addresses itself to breach of the contract by the seller,
as outlined in § 2-601, "[ IIf the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the contract the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or (b) accept the
whole.-.." Section 2-606 then explains "What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods."
Section 2-607 is entitled "Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach." [See MD. ANN. CODE,
Comm. L. Art., § 1-109: "Section captions are parts of Titles 1 through 10 of this
article."] Subsection (1) requires the buyer to pay the contract for which he accepts.
Subsection (2) states that acceptance precludes a rejection, but in the case of any breach
of the contract, presumably including warranty, the buyer may revoke his acceptance
under the following section (Id. at § 2-608, Revocation of Acceptance) provided he gives
notice. It is important to note that in § 2-607 warranty is nowhere expressly mentioned;
it is merely another action which may be brought by the buyer for breach of contract.
The notice requirement may thus be read as intended to accomplish for the buyer the
same result upon revocation of acceptance, cure by the seller if possible, as does
Section 2-508 in cases of rejection (Section 2-508 is entitled "Cure by Seller of Improper
Tender or Delivery." Under that Section the seller has an absolute right to remedy the
defect, while oftentime, where the goods have already been used to the buyer's
detriment, a cure of the goods is impossible as loss has already been sustained).
71. Mo. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-607, Comment 5 (1975).
72. Id. Comment 4; 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 260-61 (1964).
73. 19 Md. App. 467, 471-72, 311 A.2d 813, 816 (1973).
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"[I]t is not necessary that the buyer actually communicate to the seller
that the goods are defective .... [E]fforts to contact the seller through
repeated telephone calls, even though unsuccessful, are sufficient to
constitute notice.... , ,74
Another problem with the notice requirement is whether it should be
imposed when the plaintiff in the breach of warranty action is a
subpurchaser, instead of a direct buyer from the defendant, or when
the plaintiff is an injured third party, as opposed to a buyer. Often
these plaintiffs have not dealt directly with the person entitled to
notice, and will have more trouble discovering his identity. This
problem is raised in Frericks v. General Motors Corp.," where on
remand, the Circuit Court for Cecil County granted a summary
judgement for the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiff, a guest
in the automobile that contained a defect-causing injury, failed to give
notice to either the retailer or the manufacturer of the automobile. 76
This case is now docketed for review by the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals.7 7
An examination of the Code and its history reveals the complexity of
the issue that the Frericks case presents. The word "buyer" is defined
in the Code as "a person who buys or contracts to buy."7' "Seller" is
defined as a person who sells or contracts to sell goods. 9 Under these
definitions, prior to 1969 an ultimate consumer was barred from
bringing suit against a seller, and a buyer could not sue a manufacturer
because of lack of privity. As noted earlier, the Maryland legislature
eliminated the privity requirement in 1969 by amending Section 2-318
to extend a manufacturer's warranties to provide consumer remedies. 80
At the same time, the term "seller" as used in Sections 2-314 through
2-318 was re-defined to include the "manufacturer, distributor, dealer,
wholesaler, or other middleman or the retailer." 1
The terms "buyer" and "seller" as they are used in Section 2-607
were not re-defined by these amendments. The ramifications of this
omission may be characterized in at least two ways. On the one hand, it
can be argued that any attempt to apply the notice requirement to a
plaintiff not in privity with the defendant would considerably limit the
possibility of recovery under the newly-available .consumer remedies.
On the other hand, it is also arguable that the legislature did not intend
to extend a warranty remedy to parties not in privity without also
impressing on those parties the obligations that other persons entitled
to the remedy would undertake, since to do otherwise would allow

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 472, 311 A.2d at 817.
274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
No. 10307 (Cir. Ct. Cecil Co. Aug. 18, 1975).
Appeal docketed, No. 926 (Md. Ct. of Spec. App. Aug. 29, 1975).
78. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-103(1)(a) (1975).
79. Id. § 2-103(1)(d).
80. Law of April 23, ch. 249, [ 1969] Laws of Md. 209-11 (effective July 1, 1969).

81. Id.
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parties who have paid no consideration for their rights a better chance
of recovery than that given to parties whose rights have been received in
return for consideration.
Comment five to Section 2-607 explains that, to some extent at
least, third party beneficiaries do not fall within the reason of the
notice requirement, since they have nothing to do with acceptance.
However, the Comment goes on to indicate that a beneficiary is
required to notify the seller that an injury has occurred, and that,
although the time for reasonable notification after an injury may be
extended, "even a beneficiary can be properly held to the use of good
faith in notifying, once he has had time to become aware of the legal
situation." 2
Nevertheless, there is authority to support the proposition that
neither a third party beneficiary nor any other person not in privity
with the defendant is required to give notice of a breach of warranty. In
Tomcyuk v. Town of Cheshire, 3 a minor guest, who was injured while
riding a bicycle purchased by his host, was not required to give notice
to the defendant manufacturer of the breach of warranty that resulted
in his injury.8 4
After discussing the definition of "buyer" and "seller," the court
quoted Section 2-106(1): "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from
the seller to the buyer for a price. . . .""
and stated that "Where
[Section 2-607(3)] speaks of a 'tender,' it means a tender of goods. A
tender is an offer." The court then concluded:
However, it cannot be argued that the plaintiff Sandra
Tomcyuk is a "buyer" under the meaning of the statute. It
cannot be said that a "sale" was made by Union Cycle
[manufacturer] to the Cartas [owners of the bicycle] .... The
Legislature intended to make a distinction between the manufacturer as a seller to a retailer as a buyer and the retailer as a
seller to the public as buyer, for in [Section 2-607(5)] it is
provided that "[W]here the buyer is sued for a breach of
warranty... (a) he may give his seller written notice of the
litigation."...
Simply because the legislature created certain rights in a third
party beneficiary as to express or implied warranties, in
adopting [Section 2-318], does not mean by implication such a
beneficiary must give notice of an alleged breach to the
manufacturer. If it were the legislative intent to require such
notice, the Code would have said so.... . 7
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., 2-607, Comment 5 (1975).
217 A.2d 71 (Conn. Super. 1965).
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 73. See MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., 2-106(1) (1975).
Id. at 73-74.
Id. It should be noted that Connecticut had nowhere amended the definition of "seller"
in its Code, as Maryland has done in Section 2-314.
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The Tomcyuk case was followed in the more recent case of Chaffin
v. Atlantic Coca Cola Bottling Co.," which involved a situation where
the parent of the child-buyer was injured by a foreign substance in his
drink. Citing Tomcyuk, the court reiterated that the notice requirement
cannot apply to a third party beneficiary under Section 2-318.9 Since
there has been neither a tender to nor an acceptance by such party, he
cannot be held to the requirements of a buyer.
Although both Tomcyuk and Chaffin involved the notice requirement as applied to a third party beneficiary, the language of the cases is
also applicable to a subpurchaser. With regard to both potential
plaintiffs, Professor Anderson has stated:
A person not in privity with the defendant, assuming that he is
permitted to sue the defendant, is not barred for having failed
to give notice to the defendant for the Code only requires that
the plaintiff give the notice to "his seller." This carries with it
the double restriction that the plaintiff be a purchaser and that
he have purchased from the defendant. Thus the notice
provisions of UCC § 2-607 do not apply to subpurchasers or
bystanders.90
These cases and commentaries appear to indicate that the viability of
the notice requirement as applied to consumer sales is threatened. The
potential for liberal construction alleviates to a large degree its effects
on the suit of a consumer buyer against his direct seller. Furthermore,
in terms of both construction and policy, the Maryland courts may well
have the latitude to deny application of the notice requirement in a suit
for breach of warranty by a third party beneficiary or subpurchaser.
Disclaimers
Another well-documented problem for the plaintiff who seeks
recovery in warranty is the seller's ability to limit or disclaim some
portion of the liability that would otherwise follow from his warranty.9 1 Theoretically, at least, disclaimers should present no problem
to the plaintiff whose action is brought in strict liability in tort,9 2 and
in these cases the courts have generally disregarded their effects.9" The
88. 127 Ga. App. 619, 194 S.E.2d 513 (1972). See also Hickman v. Bross, 58 D.&C.2d 137
(Pa. 1972).
89. 127 Ga. App. at 620, 194 S.E.2d at 515.

90. 2 R. ANDERSON, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-SALES2-607:14 (2d ed. 1971). But
see W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 260-61
(1964), who takes the opposite view.
91. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective
Product Cases, STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Franklin]; Note,
Disclaimersof Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. lev. 318 (1963).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment m (1965). But see Franklin,
supra.
93. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In the
battle to obviate possible injustice the courts have attempted to get around disclaimers
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rationale behind the judicial antipathy toward disclaimers has been
characterized as a desire to "spread the losses" caused by defective
injury-producing goods among a large number of people, through
insurance and price increases.9 4
Until 1971, Maryland allowed the disclaimer and limitation of
implied warranties, although Section 2-316 of the Code restricts the
manner in which liability can be disclaimed.9
Effective July 1, 1971
however, the legislature added to the Code Section 2-316.1,96 which
provides:
(1) The provisions of Section 2-316 do not apply to sales of
consumer goods, as defined by Section 9-109, services," or
both.
(2) Any oral or written language used by a seller of consumer
goods and services, which attempts to exclude or modify
any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose, or to exclude or modify the consumer's
remedies for breach of those warranties, is unenforceable ....98

94.

95.

96.
97.

by finding that the disclaimer was not brought home to the buyer, or by construing it as
inapplicable to the facts. Meyers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951) (obscure
place); McPeak v. Baker, 236 Minn. 420, 53 N.W.2d 130 (1952) (only applicable to
express warranties); Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp. v. Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, 250 N.W.
713 (1933) (printed matter on reverse side of sales contract not called to buyer's
attention); Ward v. Walker, 44 N.D. 598, 176 N.W. 129 (1920) (ineffective when made
after contract).
Franklin, supra note 91 at 1009. See e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). See generally Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499 (1961).
MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-316 (1975), specifies the manner in which implied
and express warranties can be effectively excluded. See Fairchild Indus. v. Maritime Air
Service, Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 186-91, 333 A.2d 313, 316-18 (1975) ("while'expressions
like 'as is' put the buyer on notice of disclaimer, they must be conspicuous");
Sensabaugh v. Morgan Bros. Farm Supply, Inc., 223 Md. 593, 597, 165 A.2d 914, 916
(1960) (disclaiming language must be brought to a buyer's attention); National Trailer
Sales Co. v. Pate, 213 Md. 69, 72, 130 A.2d 747, 748 (1957) (where the contract of sale
stated that there were "no understandings, agreements, representations or warranties,"
buyers were precluded from recovery under the Uniform Sales Act on the theory of
implied warranty of fitness or merchantability). See also, Distillers Distrib. Corp. v.
Sherwood Distilling Co., 180 F.2d 800, 803 (4th Cir. 1950); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v.
Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super 383, 394, 268 A.2d 345, 351-52 (1970). But
see Smith v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974).
Law of May 17, 1971, ch. 505, [1971] Md. Laws 1131-32.
The reference to services in this Section has posed a source of confusion. A key question
frequently confronting the courts is whether implied warranties arise in transactions for
the sale of services as well as goods. Schuchman v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, [ 1970-1973
Transfer Binder]. CCH PROD. LIAB. REP.,
6557 (blood transfusion considered a service
not encompassed by the U.C.C.). See generally Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel
Doctrines:Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort,

19

RUTGERS

L.

REV.

692, 697 (1965).

98. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-316.1 (1975). Consumer goods, as used in this
Section, are those "used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household
purposes." Id. § 9-109(1). This Section may result in confusion as courts attempt to
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While Subsection one of Section 2-316.1 clearly eliminates the
effects of Section 2-316 on sales of consumer goods and services,
Subsection two is somewhat confusing. The Subsection is phrased
disjunctively, and the first phrase, "Any... language ... which
attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties ... .," would
appear to make unenforceable any exclusion or modification of the
implied warranties themselves in sales of consumer goods and services.
The second phrase, however, "or to exclude or modify the consumer's
remedies.. . .," while it prohibits exclusion or modification of only the
consumer's remedies, does not have the same effect on the remedies
of the "persons affected by the goods" who are given the benefit of
implied warranties under Section 2-318. Of course, as explained
previously, neither the consumer nor the "person affected" will have a
cause of action under Section 2-318 unless he has suffered "injury in
person."
It is arguable that the term "consumer" in Section 2-316.1(2) was
intended to be an abbreviated version of the list of persons who qualify
for warranty protection under Section 2-318." 9 Since Subsection one
of Section 2-316.1 eliminates altogether the effects of Section 2-316 on
sales of consumer goods and services, there would be no restriction at
all on the exclusion or modification of remedies of persons, other than
consumers, who are affected by the goods unless the term "consumer"
in Section 2-316.1(2) is taken to include them. This would seem to be
the most likely intention of the legislature since the preservation of the
warranty to persons affected by the goods would have little practical
effect unless their remedies were also preserved.
Furthermore, an interpretation of Section 2-316.1(2) that would
eliminate persons affected by the goods from its protection would
conflict with Section 2-719(3)00 which, in its prohibition of any
clearly distinguish certain consumer goods from "equipment" under § 9-109(2). Goods
are equipment "if they are used or bought for use primarily in business ..
" The
question has yet to be answered as to where this leaves an item such as an automobile
which is driven to work each day and used for family outings. Is the vehicle a "consumer
good" or "equipment"? Courts will have to determine precisely the category in which
such goods belong since under Maryland law the classifications are mutually exclusive.
McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 260 Md. 601, 618, 273 A.2d 198, 206
(1971).
Under clause (3) of § 2-316.1:
Any oral or written language used by a manufacturer of consumer goods, which
attempts to limit or modify a consumer's remedies for breach of the manufacturer's express warranties, is unenforceable, unless the manufacturer provides
reasonable and expeditious means of performing the warranty obligations.
This Section has been rendered largely academic in light of recently enacted Federal
provisions. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. §§2301-12 (1975).
99. As noted earlier, under § 2-318, warranties are extended to:
[A ]ny natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer, or who is a
guest in his home, or any other ultimate consumer or user of the goods or person
affected thereby.
100. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., 2-719(3) (1975) provides:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
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limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in sales of
consumer goods as prima facie unconscionable, indicates no intent
whatsoever to discriminate between consumers and other persons who
would have a cause of action for breach of warranty. While it can be
argued that Section 2-719(3) partially fills the void left by Section
2-316.1(2)'s failure to mention "persons affected thereby" with
respect to remedies, in that it provides at least some limitations on the
exclusion or modification of the remedy of damages for injury to those
persons, it should be noted that the effect of Section 2-719(3) on
remedies for the breach of implied warranties was perhaps eliminated
along with Section 2-316, since that Section specifically refers to
Section 2-719(3).
The legislature should be encouraged to eliminate the confusion
inherent in Subsection two of Section 2-316.1. As the matter now
stands, however, disclaimers to implied warranties and limitations of
their remedies present no obstacle to the consumer. With respect to
persons affected by the goods, it appears that the only remedy that
could be excluded or modified under even the most restricted
interpretation of Sections 2-316.1(2) and 2-719(3) would be property
damage. However, as the Court of Special Appeals recently held in
McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc.,1° I
While there is no statutory presumption of unconscionability
with respect to a limitation of consequential damages for injury
to property in the case of consumer goods,... a clause...
which attempts to exclude liability for both personal injury and
property damage by limiting liability to replacement of parts is
so tainted by unconscionability as to warrant deletion in its
02
entirety. 1
To eliminate the restriction on exclusions or modifications of
remedies for "injury to the person" of persons affected thereby, the
courts would have to take the unlikely position that the legislature
intended to both exclude such persons from the protection of
Section 2-316.1 and eliminate the effects of Section 2-719(3) on what
would otherwise be their remedies.
Should the courts hold that the term "consumers" in Section
2-316.1(2) includes persons affected by the goods, disclaimers would
have no more of an effect on claimants under the Code than they do on
strict liability claimants." 3 In this context, it should be noted that
even in strict liability jurisdictions, courts have sometimes given
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
101. No. 1102 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., filed Nov. 3, 1975).
102. Id. at 14.
103. See notes 92 and 93 supra.
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practical effect to disclaimers by allowing the defendant to avoid
liability on the grounds that the plaintiff "assumed the risk" implicit in
the disclaimer or limitation. 104
Liability of a Non-merchant
Section 2-314 provides that the warranty of merchantability is
implied in a contract for sale only when the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind.' l s While the Maryland courts have not
been confronted with the issue of whether recovery could be allowed
for breach of warranty when the seller of the goods did not normally
deal in that product, the warranty provisions do not appear to allow for
such a radical extension of liability.
A similar problem also arises in a strict liability action.' 6 According
to Comment f of Section 402A of the Restatement, strict liability is
inapplicable to the
occasional seller of food or other such products who is not
engaged in that activity as a part of his business. Thus it does
not apply to the housewife who, on one occasion, sells to her
neighbor a jar of jam or a pound of sugar. Nor does it apply to
the owner of an automobile who, on one occasion, sells it to his
neighbor.... 107
This restriction on the applicability of the strict liability doctrine has
not yet been fully defined.'
It has been held, however, that the
"business" in question need not be the main business or the raison
d'etre of the defendant. In Price v. Shell Oil Co.,' ° 9 the Shell Oil
Company was held to be in the business of leasing trucks and thus
answerable to a strict liability claim for injuries suffered by an
employee of the lessee.1 10
On the other hand, no strict liability has been imposed when courts
have found that the seller did not regularly deal in the specific goods in
question. Even California, a state which is normally a forerunner in the

104. See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965);
Maiorino v. Weco Prod. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (N.J. 1965); Santor v. A & M
Karaghensian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
105. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314(1) (1975). As discussed earlier, the term
"seller" in this Section includes the manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other
middleman or the retailer.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment f (1965); see, e.g., Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment f (1965).
108. Streatch v. Associated Container Transp., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 935 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
109. 2 Cal. 3d 245,466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
110. Contra, Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967)
aff'd, 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968). Application of strict liability was refused for injuries
sustained by a defective gas pump. The court ruled that defendant Humble Oil was not in
the business of leasing oil pumps.
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field, has seen fit to deny recovery."' Thus, Maryland's warranty law is
no more restrictive in this area than the strict liability in tort theory.
Applicability of the Code to Leases and Bailments
Although the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code do not
directly prohibit the application of warranty law to leases and
bailments," 2 the Maryland Court of Appeals has attempted to impose
this restriction. In Bona v. Graefe, 1 3 the court refused to allow
recovery under the Code to a plaintiff who was injured when the brakes
of a leased golf cart failed to operate properly. The court indicated that
the Code's warranty provisions would constitute
such an extension of
4
judicial legislation.!
In 1974, the Maryland legislature responded to the Bona decision by
extending the implied warranty of fitness for a particular use, in
Section 2-315, to leases and bailments of goods." ' Obviously, however, this amendment is of no use to the lessee or bailee whose claim
rests on the implied warranty of merchantability." 6 In light of the
111. Ruiz v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 462,93 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1971) (strict
liability for physical harm to user or consumer applies only to participants in the
marketing of the products and not to a user or consumer with respect to injuries to
others). See also Tucson Inds. Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936 (1972)
(injury caused to plaintiff's eyes from cement fumes emanating from adjoining wig
shop); accord, Streatch v. Associated Container Transp., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 935, 942
(C.D. Cal. 1975) (owner of ship not liable for injuries caused by motor vehicle used to
load cargo); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681, 686-87 (Ind.
1970) (paint supplier not liable for injury caused by flammable lacquer reducer).
112. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-106(1) (1975) provides:
In this Article unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and "agreement"
are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods.
However, Comment 2 to § 2-313 states:
Although this section [express warranties] is limited in its scope and direct
purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for
sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be
confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They
may arise in other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for
hire, whether such bailment is itself the main contract or is merely a supplying of
containers under a contract for the sale of their contents.... [Tihe matter is left
to the case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful
guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise. (emphasis added).
113. 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972).
114. Id. at 74, 285 A.2d at 609-10.
115. Law of April 30, 1974, ch. 315, [1974] Laws of Md. 1376-77, codified in MD. ANN.
CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-315 (1975):
(1) Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section, an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purposes.
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) apply to a lease of goods and a bailment for
hire of goods which pass through the physical possession of and are
maintained by the lessor, sublessor, or bailor.
116. For a complete discussion of this apparent "legislative error" see 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 197
(1974).
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court's refusal in Bona to extend the warranty provisions, it is unlikely
that it will now extend the lease clause of Section 2-315 to those
instances properly covered by Section 2-314.'
Thus, if leases and
bailments are to be covered by the implied warranty of merchantability, Section 2-314 must also be amended. There are indications that
this may have been the legislature's intent in 1974.' 1'
At first glance the theory of strict tort liability of the Restatement
appears to be of no greater assistance to the lessee or bailee than
warranty. Section 402A plainly imposes strict liability upon only sellers
of goods." 9 Nevertheless, in Price v. Shell Oil Co., 20 where an
employee of the lessee of a gasoline tank truck sued the lessor for
injuries sustained when a. ladder mounted on the tank split, the court
stated that there was no substantial difference between sellers and
non-sellers such as bailees and lessors.
In each instance, the seller or non-seller places an article on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects. In light of the policy to be subserved, it should make
no difference
that the party distributing the article has retained
2
title to it.' 1
Clearly, this interpretation of the strict liability theory by some
jurisdictions leads to a greater opportunity for recovery than warranty
law in its present form offers. While amendment to Section 2-314
would rectify the situation, the current form of the Uniform

117. Indications may be drawn from the language of the court in Myers v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 253 Md. 282, 295-96, 252 A.2d 855, 863-64 (1969) that Sections 2-314 and
2-315 overlap. Under Section 2-315, a buyer need not verbally communicate to the seller
the particular purpose for which goods are intended, if the circumstances are such that
the latter has reason to know that purpose. Under such conditions, the seller breaches
both the warranty of fitness for the purpose and merchantability if he supplies goods
that do not permit the buyer to realize the purpose intended. (See I W. HAWKLAND, A
TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE

68 (1964). In this narrow

circumstance, the court might apply the warranty of merchantability to a lease or
bailment.
118. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC MATTERS, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Item
250, November 8, 1972.

119.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS,

§ 402A (1965). However, Section 408 of the

imposes a duty of reasonable care upon lessors as follows:
One who leases a chattel as safe for immediate use is subject to liability to those
whom he should expect to use the chattel, or to be endangered by its probable
use, for physical harm caused by its use in a manner for which, and by a person
for whose use, it is leased, if the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to make it
safe for such use or to disclose its actual condition to those who may be expected
to use it.
120. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
121. Id. at 251, 466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182; accord, Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (imposed strict liability on the lessor of
trucks since the lessee put motor vehicles in the stream of commerce exposing the lessee
to as great or a greater quantum of potential harm from defective vehicles than usually
arises out of sales by the manufacturer).
RESTATEMENT
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Commercial Code in Maryland does not extend effective protection to
users of leased or bailed goods.
Plaintiff's Recision of the Sale
One of the difficulties noted by Dean Prosser regarding recovery
under a warranty action was that recision of the sale by the buyer
precludes recovery under breach of warranty.' 2 2 Although this rule
the fact
prevailed in a majority of states,' 2 3 Dean Prosser acknowledged
24
that such has never been the situation in Maryland.
When the Uniform Sales Act was in effect, the Court of Appeals in
Russo v. Hochschild Kohn & Co. 12' held that the recision of a contract
and recovery of the purchase price paid would not bar the recovery of
special damages arising out of the breach of warranty in connection
with a sales contract. 26 At present there is no indication that the
Russo holding will be disturbed as a result of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The Russo decision that recovery of the purchase price paid in
connection with the sale does not bar the elements of special damages is
still, and will probably remain, viable law.' 27
Statute of Limitations Problems
One of the major problems in a breach of warranty action involves
the statute of limitations provided in the Code. Section 2-725 provides
that an action for breach of warranty must be commenced within four
years after the cause of action has accrued. 2 ' The cause of action for
breach of warranty accrues when tender of delivery is made unless the
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods, in
which case it accrues on the date the defect was or should have been
discovered.' 2 9
This statute of limitations has consistently been held applicable to
product liability actions based on a breach of warranty, except in some
jurisdictions where a general statute of limitations applies to all actions
claiming damages for personal injury, regardless of the theory of
122. Prosser, 69 YALEL. J. at 1131.
123. E.g., Walter-Wallingford Coal Co. v. A. Himes Coal Co., 223 Mich. 576, 194 N.W. 493
(1923); Henry v. Rudge & Guenzel Co., 118 Neb. 260, 224 N.W. 294 (1929); Boviard &
Seyfang Mfg. Co. v. Maitland, 92 Ohio St. 201, 110 N.E. 749 (1915); Stanley Drug Co. v.
Smith, Kline & French Labs., 313 Pa. 368, 170 A. 274 (1934).
124. Prosser, 69 YALEL. J. at 1131 n. 188.
125. 184 Md. 462, 41 A.2d 600 (1945) (defective hair lacquer pads caused scalp infection).
126. Id. at 467, 41 A.2d at 602; accord, Distillers Distrib. Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling Co.,
180 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1950) (where a buyer has the right to rescind a sale for breach of
warranty, he also has an election to accept goods and to sue for damages for the breach
without returning or offering to return the goods).
127. See Addressograph-Multilith Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 286, 329 A.2d 28, 34 (1974)
(citing with approval the holding in Russo).
128. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-725(1) (1975).
129. Id. § 2-725(2). For a general discussion of the "future performance" exception and
other statute of limitations problems involved in breach of warranty actions, see Burch,
A Practitioner's Guide to the Statutes of Limitations in Product Liability Suits,
beginning at p. 23 of this issue.
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recovery.
Since Maryland has no general personal injury statute of
limitations, the limitations period in Section 2-725 will probably be
deemed applicable to all product liability cases based on breach of
warranty. 3 '
This limitation period presents a virtually insurmountable obstacle to
a plaintiff who sustains injury more than four years after he purchases
the product. In addition, Section 2-725(1) permits a seller to further
limit his liability to one year after delivery, by so specifying in the
contract of sale. The warranty plaintiff is generally at a greater
disadvantage in this respect than the plaintiff whose action is brought in
strict liability in tort.'3 2 The statute of limitations in a strict liability
action is generally governed by tort
law and runs from the date of
133
injury, rather than the date of sale.
The Requirements of Reliance
and the ContributoryNegligence Problem
Historically, warranty principles required that the claimant act in
reliance upon some representation or assurance, or some promise or
undertaking given to him by the defendant.' 34 In the modem sales
market it is often difficult, if not impossible, to prove reliance when the
ultimate user has not dealt with all the parties in the vertical chain of
title. However, with regard to the warranty of merchantability, the
Code imposes no specific reliance requirement. The official comments
to the Code indicate only that the breach of warranty of merchantability must be a proximate cause of the injuries sustained. 1"'
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in Erdman v. Johnson Brothers, 136 dispensed with any reliance difficulty in cases of the warranty of
merchantability by recognizing that the requirement is simply another
way of saying that lack of proximate cause is available as a defense in a
breach of warranty action. The court stated:
It would appear that an individual using a product when he had
actual knowledge of a defect or knowledge of facts which were
so obvious that he must have known of a defect, is either no
longer relying on the seller's express or implied warranty, or has
interjected an intervening cause of his own, and therefore a
breach of such warranty cannot be regarded as the proximate
cause of the ensuing injury.1 37

130. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, 63 N.J. 130, 153-56, 305 A.2d 412, 420-26 (1973).
131. See Burch, supra note 129 at 27.
132. Note, The Statute of Limitations in Strict Products Liability Actions, 24 BUFF. L. REv.
477 (1974).
133. See Burch, supra note 129 at 33.
134. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
135. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314, Comment 13 (1975).

136. 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970).
137. Id. at 196-97, 271 A.2d at 747.
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The court discussed abandonment of reliance, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, intervening cause and absence of proximate
cause and concluded that attempting to differentiate the various terms
was an exercise in semantics,1 38 stating that under any of the theories
the important factor is that:
[A]lthough there may have been a breach of the warranty...
the breach is no longer considered 'the proximate cause of the
loss.' .

.

39

The lack of proximate cause of an injury is thus more significant
than the lack of reliance or the fact that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. This position is highly analagous to that taken in strict
liability cases. Proximate causation must be proved, and, generally,
assumption of risk is allowed as a defense, 4 ' while a defense of
contributory negligence, or mere failure to discover a defect is
not.' 4 ' If the consumer discovers the defect, or knows the danger
arising from it and deliberately proceeds to encounter the danger by
using the product he assumes the risk and recovery is barred.14 2 It
appears then that reliance, contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk are no more a problem under a warranty theory of action than
under strict liability.
Other Problems of Proof
Few, if any, essential differences persist with respect to the nature of
proof required to establish the respective causes of action for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability and strict liability in tort.
Comment 4 to Section 2-314 of the Code outlines the requisites of
proof of a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability:
[1]t is of course necessary to show not only the existence of the
warranty but the fact that the warranty was broken and that

138. Id. at 197-200, 271 A.2d at 747-49.
139. Id. at 200, 271 A.2d at 749.
140. See dictum in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
141. Id. at 485. See, e.g., Bennett v. International Shoe Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 797, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 318 (1969); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr.
306 (1968); Fore v. Veneer Mfg. Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 346, 287 N.E.2d 526 (1972);
Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co. Inc., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Boufield v.
LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1966).
In some cases, assumption of risk is based on the disclaimer or limitation of the
warranty that accompanied the goods. See cases cited in note 104 supra and
accompanying text.
142. Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962) (smoking in bed);
Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964) (opening
bottle improperly); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 NJ. 434, 212
A.2d 769 (1965) (driving truck knowing brakes to be bad); Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros.,
281 N.Y. 474, 24 N.E.2d 131 (1939) (improper cooking of pork).
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the breach of
the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss
4 3
sustained.'

The quantum of proof necessary to give rise to a prima facie case of
strict liability in tort is equally narrow, limited and specific: where a
product is sold in a defective condition that is unreasonably dangerous
to the consumer and the consumer suffers injury
proximately caused by
144
the defect, the seller is liable to the consumer.
Some courts have apparently been confused about the necessity for
the plaintiff in a strict liability action to establish that the alleged
defect was "unreasonably dangerous.",' 4' As a result of the development of a public policy that the cost of injuries from defective products
should be borne by manufacturers,' 46 the current tendency is to reject
as a necessary prerequisite to recovery the proof that the injury-causing
product was "unreasonably dangerous," and to require only proof of
some defective deviation in construction. 147 Summarily, then, there is,
as a matter of practicality, no distinction between what the plaintiff
must prove in a strict liability or breach of warranty action.
Substantial problems exist under both causes of action in connection
with products that are unavoidably dangerous. Generally, if the dangers
which inhere in the product are generic to its utility,'

4

the defects will

4

not give rise to a cause of action.' ' Knives are not defective because
they can cut, for without the capacity to cut, they would have no
usefulness. So, too, butter may cause artereosclerosis, smoking cigarettes may cause cancer and liquor may cause liver damage; these too are
unavoidably dangerous product defects which foreclose any possibility
of recovery. Consumer injury in this area, while cautiously not defined
as the result of contributory negligence, is based on a policy of
precluding a plaintiff from recovery for his failure to possess knowledge
that is an integral part of being alive,"' 0 that is, a failure to expect
generally known dangers.' 5 '
Although further distinctions may yet be drawn with reference to
what is needed to plead and prove individual actions under the
143. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314, Comment 4 (1975).
144. Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919, 922 (Mun. App. D.C. 1962).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965). See also Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
32 III. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d
189 (1965).
146. E.g. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 428 (N.D. Ind. 1965); McGrath v.
White Motor Corp., 258 Ore. 583, 596, 484 P.2d 838, 844 (1971).
147. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
148. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972);
Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973).
149. Rheingold, What are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations?," 22 Bus. LAW. 589
(1967).
150. Note, 42 FORD. L.

REV.

943 (1974).

151. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 302 (3d Cir. 1961); Note, 42
FORD. L. REV.

943 (1974).
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alternative theories of strict liability and breach of warranty, the single
most distinct impression conveyed in an analysis of the relative
requirements of the two lies not in any disparity between the doctrines
but in the analogy."5 2
Wrongful Death Damages
Wrongful Death Acts in most states provide that certain designated
persons may maintain an action for damages against a person whose
wrongful act caused the death of a close relative of the designated
person. It has been suggested that, because of its contract associations,
a breach of warranty can not provide an appropriate basis for a suit for
wrongful death damages."5 3 Although some jurisdictions have denied
recovery,"5 4 others have allowed it.'
The tort nature of the strict
liability action presents no problem when it is used as the basis for
wrongful death recovery.1 6
Maryland's Wrongful Death Act defines a "wrongful act" as "an act,
neglect, or default including a felonious act which would have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death
had not ensued."' 5 7 The Maryland appellate courts have not ruled on
whether a breach of warranty falls within this definition. However, the
Maritime Amendment to the Wrongful Death Act, 5 ' which uses the
same language, has been interpreted by the United States District Court
for Maryland to extend a wrongful death action when the decedent's
death was caused by a non-negligent act of a ship. 5 9 In Smith v. A/S
Nabella,160 the court expressed a belief that:
[T]he Maryland Court would hold that the Maryland statute is
not limited to the wrongful acts, neglects and defaults with
which the legislators who adopted it were familiar, but that the
152. Note, 42 FORD. L. REv. 943 (1974). For a further discussion of the problems of proof in
a product liability action, see Powell, Proof of a Defect or Defectiveness, beginning at

p. 77 of this issue.
153. Prosser, 69 YALEL. J. at 1128.

154. Denny v. Seabord Lacquer, Inc., 487 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying Alabama law);
Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 480 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072 (1973)
(applying Georgia law); Geohagen v. General Motors Corp., 291 Ala. 167, 279 So. 2d
436 (1973); Necktas v. General Motors Corp., 357 Mass. 546, 259 N.E.2d 234 (1970);
Post v. Manitowoc Eng'r Corp., 88 N.J. Super. 199, 211 A.2d 386 (1965).
155. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) (applying Kansas
law but issue of whether the Kansas wrongful death statute permitted recovery based on
breach of warranty was not specifically raised); Kelley v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 110 N.H. 369, 268 A.2d 837 (1970) (scope of amended wrongful death statute
was broader than Maryland's).
156. Cases that have allowed wrongful death recovery under strict liability include Dagley v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F. Supp. 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
157. MD.ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-901(e) (1975).
158. Id. at 3-902(b).
159. Gladden v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 176 F. Supp. 664 (D. Md. 1959).
160. 176 F. Supp. 668 (D. Md. 1959).

72

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 5

statute was intended to apply to all wrongful acts, neglects, and
time would entitle the party
defaults which from time to
61
injured to maintain an action.1
This construction by the federal courts of the Maritime Amendment
might well persuade the Maryland appellate courts to similarly construe
the remaining portions of the Wrongful Death Act. 1 62 Even if this
construction is accepted, however, it can be argued that a wrongful
death claimant is not an appropriate plaintiff in a breach of warranty
action brought under the Uniform Commercial Code. Since the plaintiff
was not a party to the contract, his cause of action must arise under
Section 2-318 and, so the argument would go, the emotional anguish
suffered due to the death of another would not constitute the "injury
to person" necessary to qualify under that Section.
The contra argument is that the Wrongful Death Statute specifically
creates a cause of action for the "injury in person" that results from the
death of a close relative, giving the claimant a cause of action to the
degree that the decedent, had he lived, would have had one.1 63 Thus,
once it is established that a breach of warranty is a wrongful act, the
Wrongful Death Statute, and not the Code, determines the parties
entitled to recovery.
It should be noted in this context, however, that the cause of action
in wrongful death is for the wrong to the beneficiary, not the wrong to
the decedent. 164 The beneficiary does not stand in the shoes of his
decedent, as would the personal representative in a survival
action.1 6 1 Since the breach of warranty action is limited to persons
covered by the warranty, it can be argued that the wrongful death
claimant must establish himself as one to whom the benefits of the
warranty extend before he can be allowed to use a breach of the
warranty as the basis for his claim. Under Section 2-318 of the Code, he
must establish not only that he was affected by the goods but also that
he suffered "injury in person." Whether the Maryland courts would
hold that mental anguish constitutes a sufficient "injury in person" to
enable the wrongful death claimant to qualify under Section 2-318 is an
open question.
A potential for an anomaly could arise if a breach of warranty is
allowed to provide the basis for a claim for wrongful death damages.
161. Id. at 671.
162. Santoni v. Mallenckrodt Chem. Works, No. 5107 (Balt. City Super. Ct., July 7, 1975)
held that an action for wrongful death damages could be based on a breach of warranty
theory, relying on the analogy of the Nabella decision.
163. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-901(e) (1975).
164. See, e.g., Jennings v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1959); Sun Cab. Co. v.
Walston, 15 Md. App. 113, 289 A.2d 804 (1972).
165. For cases that have defined the differences between a wrongful death action and one
brought by a personal representative, see Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149,
297 A.2d 721 (1972); Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49
(1906).
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The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action runs from the
date of death and expires after three years,' 6 6 while a breach of
warranty action runs for four years from the date of the breach, which
is the date of the tender of the goods.' 67 If a decedent's injury does not
result in his death until after the warranty limitations period has run,
the wrongful death claimant might have a cause of action where his
decedent's, had he lived, would have been time-barred.' 68 The same
potential exists with a negligence or strict liability in tort action,
however, where the limitations period usually runs from the date of
injury.' 69 Again, there is a possibility that the decedent may linger
after the injury until his original action is time-barred.
The problems that would arise in a wrongful death action based on a
breach of warranty can be resolved by an inquiry into the basic nature
of the Wrongful Death Act: What is the extent to which recovery under
the Act is limited by the requirements of the theory of recovery that
provides the underlying basis for the claim? A thorough analysis of the
history, and intent of the Act, with special emphasis on the definition
of a "wrongful act," will be required of the appellate court that finally
confronts the issue.
Damages
Although various issues involving the damages recoverable under
both strict liability in tort and warranty theories have been discussed
throughout this article, it is helpful to summarize the current state of
the law in this area.
There seems to be no question but that damages for personal injury
may be recovered by a buyer, a consumer or user of the defective
product under both strict liability in tort and warranty.' 70 In many of
the jurisdictions that adopt the theory of strict liability, recovery by a
bystander for personal injury is also allowed. 7' It would appear that,
as a result of Maryland's amendments to the Code, a similar
result will
17 2
inure to the bystander who brings his action in warranty.

166. MD.ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-904(f) (1975).
167. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-725(1), (2).
168. For a more extensive discussion of this problem, see Burch, supra note 129, at 45.
169. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 5-101 provides the statute of limitations for
negligence actions in this state. For a discussion of the statute of limitations applicable in
strict liability, see Burch, supra note 129 at 45.
170. As to such recovery in warranty cases in Maryland, see Frericks v. General Motors Corp.,
274 Md. 288, 301, 336 A.2d 118, 126 (1975).
Cases illustrating recovery by consumers and userg of products under a strict
liability theory include, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
171. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1964); Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). But see cases cited note
49, supra.
172. See discussion at p. 53 supra.
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Recovery for physical harm to the property of users and consumers,
even though they are not in privity with the defendant, as well as
buyers, is available under strict liability.' 7 3 The same is true as to
buyers in Maryland, but such recovery by users and consumers depends
on whether the Maryland courts will interpret the term "injured in
person" in Section 2-318 of the Code to include physical injury to a
person's property, and if not, whether recovery of property damage will
be allowed once it is proved that the person qualifies under Section 2-318 by suffering "injury in person," however that term is
interpreted. '74 The construction given to this term will also have an
effect on whether wrongful death damages, and other such recovery can
be allowed on a warranty theory. ' This recovery is available in strict
liability in tort.' 76
While some courts have allowed recovery for economic loss to parties
not in privity with the defendant under a theory of strict liability in
tort,' 7 7 the better view seems to be that such damages will not be
'
allowed. 78
Economic loss for breach of warranty is not recoverable
under warranty law in Maryland by third party beneficiaries,' 79 unless,
perhaps, they have also suffered "injury in person," but such recovery
could logically be allowed to subpurchasers to the same extent that it is
allowed to a buyer. 8 0 As to punitive damages, recovery is generally not
allowed under a breach of warranty theory and any recovery under a
strict liability theory would most likely be allowed only where the
additional elements of proof generally required are presented.""
With respect to the measure and type of damages recoverable under
the Code, the provisions of Subsections two and three of Section 2-714
bear direct relevance:
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have
173. See Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
174. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), where the
plaintiff was allowed to recover from a manufacturer in an indemnity suit for damages he
had paid to persons and property injured when defective brakes in his tractor-trailer
resulted in its collision with a passenger bus.
175. See discussion at p. 54 supra.
176. Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Montgomery v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
177. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
178. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Prosser, 69 YALEL. J. at 1143.
179. Addressograph-Multilith v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 280, 329 A.2d 28, 30-31 (1974).
180. Since the term seller has been re-defined by Section 2-314 to include manufacturers and
other parties in the vertical chain of privity a buyer should be permitted to recover the
same type and measure of damages from the manufacturer as he would be from his direct
seller.
181. For a discussion of the problems involved with punitive damages claims in product
liability cases, see Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Product Liability Claims, 6
GA.L. REv. 613 (1972).
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had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages
under the next section may also be recovered.
The essence of what is embraced within the term "consequential
damages" in Section 2-714 is further defined in Section 2-715(2)(b),
wherein it is dictated:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty.
It should be noted that this
measurement of such damages.
tion 2-715:

Section does not require precise
As stated in Comment 4 to Sec-

The burden of proving the extent of loss incurred by way of
consequential damage is on the buyer, but the section on liberal
administration of remedies rejects any doctrine of certainty
which requires almost mathematical precision in the proof of
loss. Loss may be determined in any manner which is reasonable
under the circumstances.18 2
The earlier treatment in this article of disclaimers is also relevant to
this discussion of damages. In summary, it appears that, with respect to
consumer goods, Section 2-316 and 2-719 of the Code, taken together,
prohibit the exclusion or limitation of remedies in implied warranties
with the exception that property damage or economic loss to one who
is not a buyer or consumer may perhaps be limited or excluded. 8 3
CONCLUSION
This comparison of warranty with strict liability in tort has
illustrated that while the scope of recovery allowed under the Code in
Maryland closely approaches that which might be available under strict
liability in tort, it is nevertheless deficient in a few areas. The basic
question that must be re-examined by the Maryland courts and
legislature is whether or to what extent the remaining distinguishing
characteristics and requirements of the warranty theory of recovery
should permit defendants to avoid liability for their defective products.
The adoption of strict liability in tort would solve the immediate
182. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-715, Comment 4 (1975).
183. See discussion at p. 60-64, supra.
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problem. New problems might arise, however, in interpreting the
doctrine and resolving its conflicts with warranty law.' 8 4 The alternative solution is to continue the current pattern of judicial clarification
and amendments to the Code, accomplishing "strict liability" via
warranty, instead of tort. While this evolution of warranty law might
take longer to accomplish, the result could be a clearer definition of
rights and liabilities, supported by a rationale more consistent with the
historical precepts of warranty and tort law.
184. For a discussion of possible problems of conflict, see Franklin, supra note 91.

